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BOOK REVIEW
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE HIGH COURT
COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME
COURT. By Joyce Murdoch and Deb Price. Basic Books, New York,
2001. viii and 582 pages. Hard back $32.50
Reviewed by Donald H.J. Hermann*
One image that captures the approach of the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court to homosexuals' is that of the three monkeys
who each respectively clasp their hands over their eyes, ears, and
mouth, thus neither seeing, hearing, nor saying something evil or for-
bidden. Only reluctantly has the Court confronted "the love that dare
not speak its name ' 2 by taking up cases that deal with gay and lesbian
individuals "saying," "doing," and "being."
The earliest, as well as the most recent, cases in which the Supreme
Court has addressed the issues of gay rights involve the issue of "say-
ing" or First Amendment rights of free speech and association. In
1958, the Court decided One Inc. v. Olesen, upholding the right of
One, which was produced in Los Angeles and subtitled "The Homo-
sexual Magazine," to use the United States Postal Service in defiance
of a law that banned the mailing of any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or
filthy publication.3 The Court, without hearing arguments, reversed
the Ninth Circuit, which had found the publication "morally deprav-
* Professor of Law and Philosophy, DePaul University College of Law. A.B., 1965, Stanford
University; J.D., 1968, Columbia University; LL.M., 1974, Harvard University; M.A., 1979,
Northwestern University; Ph.D., 1981, Northwestern University; M.A.A.H., 1993, School of the
Art Institute of Chicago; M.L.A., 2001, University of Chicago.
1. "Homosexual" is used in this article to include gay men, lesbians, bisexuals and trans-
gendered persons. No Justice of the United States Supreme Court is reported to have used the
terms "gay" or "lesbian" in any oral argument or opinion until the 1996 decision in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See JOYCE MURDOCH AND DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY
MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 473 (2001) [hereinafter COURTING JUSTICE] (re-
porting on the oral argument in Romer "that the justices had seemed at ease saying 'gay' and
'lesbian'-words that no one uttered during Hardwick's oral argument.").
2. Lord Alfred Douglas, Two Loves (1896), quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTA-
TIONS 255 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992).
3. 355 U.S. 371 (1958).
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ing and debasing" and, thus, obscene and unmailable. 4 Implicitly, the
Court's ruling rejected equating homosexuality with obscenity.
More recently, however, the Supreme Court has found that the First
Amendment can support exclusion of gay men's membership in the
Boy Scouts. In 2000, the Court decided Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, finding that enforcement of a state anti-discrimination statute
compelling the Boy Scouts of America to admit an avowed homosex-
ual would violate the organization's First Amendment right of expres-
sive association. 5 A dissenting justice suggested that the majority's
opinion implied that a homosexual communicates a message by his
mere open existence.6
On the issue of "doing," the Court has maintained an unwavering
position that the Constitution provides no barrier to a state criminally
prosecuting homosexual acts of sodomy. The Court did not directly
confront the question of the constitutionality of state sodomy laws un-
til 1976. In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Rich-
mond, the Court rejected the arguments put forward by active
homosexuals who claimed that Virginia's sodomy statute denied them
a right to private and consensual sexual gratification in violation of
their First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and associa-
tion and the statute violated the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the extent that married couples were permitted
to engage in similar sexual activity.7 The Court affirmed, without ex-
planation, the lower court's finding that the state sodomy statute was
constitutional.
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick, overturn-
ing the United States District Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision finding that Georgia's sodomy law infringed
fundamental constitutional rights by criminalizing private sexual acts
between consenting adults.8 A majority of the Court found that the
federal Constitution does not confer upon homosexuals a fundamen-
tal right to engage in sodomy; therefore, there was no basis for declar-
ing unconstitutional state laws making such conduct illegal. 9
On the issue of "being" a gay or lesbian, the Court has evidenced a
progressive shift from condemnation of homosexuals, by justifying de-
nial of rights based on a person's homosexuality, to recognition of le-
4. One Inc. v. Otto K. Oleson, 241 F.2d 772, 778-79 (9th Cir., 1957), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S.
371 (1958).
5. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
6. Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
7. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (D.C. E.D. Va. 1975), affd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
8. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
9. Id. at 190-91.
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gal rights of gays and lesbians in civil society. The Court has moved to
recognition of legitimate claims of gays and lesbians to rights of pro-
tection from discrimination and to the right to participate in govern-
mental processes. The earlier position is illustrated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Services
in which the Court decided that a person could be denied citizenship
and deported for his status as a homosexual by finding that such a
condition constituted a "psychopathic personality.' 10 According to
the Court's opinion in Boutilier, "Congress used the phrase 'psycho-
pathic personality' not in the clinical sense, but to effectuate its pur-
pose to exclude from entry all homosexuals and other sex perverts."I'
While the exclusion of persons on the basis of homosexuality has
been reversed by agency policy and subsequent congressional action, 12
in other contexts the Court itself has changed its view of the legal
significance of the personal status of homosexuals. In 1995, the Court
decided Romer v. Evans, striking down a Colorado law prohibiting the
state or any of its subdivisions or agencies from adopting or enforcing
a law or policy that made homosexual conduct, practice, or relation-
ship a basis for any claim of discrimination or protected status.1 3 The
Court found that the Colorado law identified persons by the single
trait of their sexual orientation and then denied them legal protection
across the board. 14 The Court concluded that the Colorado law classi-
fied "homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else;" the Court reasoned that Colorado
could not do this because "[a] state cannot so deem a class of persons
as stranger to its laws.' 5 Thus, the Court found that a person's status
as a homosexual alone cannot justify denial of equal protection of the
law.
The squeamish quality of the Supreme Court's handling of cases
involving homosexuals provides the major theme of Courting Justice:
Gay Men and Lesbians v. the Supreme Court by Joyce Murdoch, a
managing editor of The National Journal and former editor at The
Washington Post, and Deb Price, a reporter for The Detroit News and
a former Washington Post editor.
10. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
11. Id. at 122.
12. See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (1990)
(eliminating the deviate/psychopathic exclusion). See also CONG. REC. S8564 (daily ed. May 9,
1989) (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson) (statement of sponsoring senator that the revisions of
the immigration statute were meant to override the United States Supreme Court ruling in Bou-
tilier and to revise the policy of excluding persons on the basis of their homosexuality).
13. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 635.
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Courting Justice not only reviews every major opinion dealing with
gay and lesbian rights with the exception of AIDS/HIV-related cases,
it also analyzes every major denial of certiorari by the Court in gay-
related cases. While the authors ignore possible non-gay influences
on such denials, the pattern described in the book sufficiently estab-
lishes a significant history of the Court's avoidance of issues involving
homosexuals, including gays and the military,' 6 same-gender mar-
riage, 17 and employment discrimination in the public sector. 18 Several
of the Justices themselves from time to time have criticized the Court
for its reluctance to grant certiorari in cases involving significant issues
of gay and lesbian rights. In 1978, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
objected to the denial of certiorari in Ratchford v. Gay Lib, accusing
the Court of retreating into "a sort of judicial storm cellar" to avoid
deciding whether a university gay student group could be banned by a
regulation that the Chief Justice approvingly compared to a quaran-
tine measure directed at a contagious disease like the measles. 19 Jus-
tices who are more sympathetic to claims of gay and lesbian rights
have also denounced the Court's reluctance to address these issues in
cases like the 1985 rejection of certiorari in Rowland v. Mad River
Local School District, Montgomery County, Ohio.20 Rowland in-
volved a high school guidance counselor's claims of a constitutional
rights violation based upon the termination of her employment after
she confided to a co-employee that she was bisexual.21 Justice William
Brennan viewed the dismissal as based on the individual's bisexual
status; according to Justice Brennan, the Court was ignoring the fol-
lowing claim: "'The Equal Protection Clause protects against arbitrary
and irrational classifications and against invidious discrimination
stemming from prejudice and hostility.' Under this rubric, discrimina-
tion against homosexuals or bisexuals based solely on their sexual
preference raises significant constitutional questions under both
prongs of our settled equal protection analysis. '22
16. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F. 2d. 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated en banc,
875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Adams v. Howertown, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), affd on other grounds,
673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
18. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, Montgomery County, Ohio, 730
F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
19. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1081 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also
COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 203-4.
20. 470 U.S. t009 (1985).
21. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See COURTIING JUSTICE, supra note 1,
at 246-51.
22. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 245 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
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Courting Justice lacks a theoretical structure or integrating juris-
prudicial view; rather, it is a chronological history of a half century of
Supreme Court decisions, detailing approximately seventy cases sub-
mitted to the Court, including twelve fully briefed and argued cases,
six summarily dismissed cases, and approximately fifty other petitions
that the Court refused to hear.
The authors developed their account using opinions and other court
documents, news reports, transcripts of oral arguments, written briefs,
interviews with litigants and their attorneys, and, most significantly,
interviews with court clerks. The authors examined the available pa-
pers of twelve former Justices, and the authors interviewed 103 former
clerks of United States Supreme Court Justices sitting during the pe-
riod of time covered by the book, finding twenty-two to be homosex-
ual (eighteen gay men and four lesbians). No sitting Justice submitted
to an interview.
In addition to providing an account of the factual background and
legal issues in all the significant legal cases involving gay and lesbian
issues, the authors provide informative biographical information
about the Supreme Court Justices and litigants. For instance, the au-
thors report evidence and speculate that Justice Frank Murphy, who
served on the Court from 1940-1949, was possibly a homosexual. 23
According to the authors, Murphy, who was never married, although
twice engaged to women, "found creative ways" to work and cohabit
with longtime male friend Edmond Kemp.2 4 In anticipation of a mar-
riage that was foreclosed by Murphy's untimely death, the authors re-
port that "Murphy instructed the secretary to find a Washington house
where she, Murphy, Murphy's bride and Kemp could live together af-
ter the wedding. '25
By contrast, the authors discuss the possible significance of Justice
Lewis F. Powell's assertion to fellow Justices and one of his clerks: "I
don't believe I've ever met a homosexual. '26 According to the au-
thors, Justice Powell was originally a member of a five Justice majority
to sustain a finding in Bowers v. Hardwick that a state sodomy statute
was unconstitutional; possibly pressured by Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger, Justice Powell switched his vote, resulting in a majority finding the
Georgia state sodomy statute constitutional.2 7 The authors report that
Justice Powell joined the anti-gay majority opinion despite the fact
that he had a propensity for appointing gay clerks and that he, in fact,
23. COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 18-21.
24. Id. at 19.
25. Id. at 21.
26. Id. at 273.
27. Id. at 311-13.
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had a gay clerk at the time Bowers was decided.2 8 Justice Powell was
reportedly so touchy about the subject of homosexuality that he apol-
ogized to clerks to whom he assigned gay-related cases.
Courting Justice includes biographical material on litigants such as
Michael Hardwick, a litigant in the Court's landmark sodomy case,
Bowers v. Hardwick. Hardwick was a twenty-eight-year-old bartender
in a gay club in Atlanta, Georgia when a police officer entered his
home without Hardwick's knowledge and found Hardwick and a guest
engaged in mutual fellatio.29 The authors also report on the struggle
of Olympic decathlon athlete Tom Waddel to establish an interna-
tional gay athletic competition, the "Gay Olympic Games. '30 Waddell
faced ultimate defeat in 1987 when the Court ruled in San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. & Thomas F. Waddell, M.D., v. United States
Olympic Committee & International Olympic Committee that a law re-
stricting the term "Olympic" by the USOC was constitutional and au-
thorized the United States Olympic Committee & International
Olympic Committee (USOC) to prevent a gay group from titling its
sports competition an "Olympics" .31
The book even includes accounts of interesting litigants whose cases
were denied a hearing by the Supreme Court. For example, the au-
thors discuss the career of Frank Kameny, a government astronomer
who was denied a Civil Service job with the Army Map Service on the
basis of his arrest for homosexual activity in a public restroom.32
Kameny challenged his firing, ultimately petitioning the Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari in 1961 in Kameny v. Brucker.33
Kameny became a gay rights activist, cofounding the District of Co-
lumbia chapter of a pioneer gay rights organization, the Mattachine
Society, and a chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union that
Kameny persuaded to pursue gay rights. 34 Kameny spent much of his
life advising homosexuals about their employment rights within the
Civil Service and counseling individuals about military and security
clearances.
Courting Justice is significant as an example of Realist Jurispru-
dence. According to one commentator, "In American jurisprudence,
the term 'realism' is used primarily . . . as designating scepticism
against legal concepts and rules and the part they play in the adminis-
28. COURTING JusTICE, supra note 1, at 275, 335-37.
29. Id. at 277-79.
30. Id. at 364-66.
31. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
32. COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 55-64.
33. 282 F.2d 823 (App. D.C. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
34. COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 61-63.
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tration of justice"; instead, American realism looks to psychological,
social, and contextual influences as the explanation for legal judicial
decisions.35 The authors of Courting Justice suggest their own adher-
ence to this approach to constitutional decision making when they
quote at length a story of Justice William 0. Douglas who reported
that:
[Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes] made a statement to me
which at the time was shattering but which over the years turned
out to be true: "Justice Douglas, you must remember one thing. At
the constitutional level where we work, [ninety] percent of any deci-
sion is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for
supporting our predilections. '36
At some length, the author's attempt to establish that Justice Pow-
ell's extreme discomfort with homosexuality led to his ultimate vote to
uphold the constitutionality of sodomy statutes in Bowers v. Hard-
wick.37 Similarly, the authors suggest that a deep seated loathing of
homosexuality on the part of Justice Antonin Scalia led him to his
dissent in Romer v. Evans by which he declared a "moral disapproval
of homosexual conduct. '38
On the other hand, the authors attribute great importance to gay
and lesbian clerks, revealing their own homosexuality to the Justices
whom they serve. The authors regard it as significant that Justice Wil-
liam 0. Douglas had two lesbian neighbor friends who lived next door
to his summer home. 39 The authors relate that Justice Harry Black-
mun acknowledged continuing affection for a law clerk following her
disclosure to the Justice that she was a lesbian.40 Also noted in the
book is Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's gift to a lesbian former clerk
on the occasion of her former clerk's commitment ceremony. 41 Simi-
larly, the authors of Courting Justice report on Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's note of sympathy to a gay court employee upon the death
of his partner.42 While the authors decry the United States Supreme
Court's willful blindness and active hostility toward hearing the cases
involving claims of rights by gays and lesbians, the authors of Courting
Justice offer some optimism that as Justices emerge from an institu-
tional isolationism in which homosexuals seem absent to a real world
35. Alf Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE § 13 (English ed. 1958), reprinted in part in MARK
MAcGUIGAN, JURISPRUDENCE: READINGS AND CASES 234 (University of Toronto Press 1966).
36. COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 12-13.
37. Id. at 334-37.
38. Id. at 478-79 (quoting 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
39. Id. at 128-31.
40. Id. at 415-16.
41. Id. at 421.
42. COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 418.
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involving gays and lesbians in every sphere of activity, the Court will
become more accommodating to assertion of gay and lesbian rights.43
Courting Justice also adopts a longstanding claim that well-reasoned
dissenting opinions advance claims of social justice and minority rights
by providing a foundation for future recognition of such rights. The
authors discuss Justice Brennan's view that dissents are a valuable
means of laying the foundation for subsequent legal breakthroughs
and provide a basis for later landmark Supreme Court rulings.44
While there has always been a view that dissenting opinions undercut
the authority of judicial rulings, since the 1940s there has been coun-
tering strong support for dissenting opinions as reflections of strong
divisions among Justices and for the writing of dissents as a practice
rooted in Jeffersonian democracy. 45 As the views in dissenting opin-
ions of a number of Justices including Justices Louis Brandeis,
Hughes, and Harlan F. Stone were later accepted by court majorities,
the importance of the well-reasoned and socially just dissenting opin-
ions came to be recognized. 46 Justice Douglas captured this position
43. Joyce Murdoch and Deb Price, A Sorry History of Anti-Gay Bias, THE NAT'L L.J., July 9,
2001, at A24.
44. COURTING JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 246.
45. See Jack R. Schmidhauser, The Judiciary, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN JUDI-
CIAL SYSTEM 611-12 (Robert J. Janosik ed., 1987).
46. The Flag salute cases provide a classic example of a dissenting opinion providing the basis
for a later majority holding recognizing a claim of constitutional right. For more, see WILLIAM
0. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 352 (1954), in which Justice Douglas mentions a line of
cases involving the refusal of Jehovah witnesses to salute the flag. Justice Douglas writes: "The
first decision was rendered June 3, 1940. Harlan F. Stone was the sole dissenter. But his dis-
sent-that no government can compel a person 'to bear false witnesses to his religion' was soon
to win a majority of the court." Id.
In the first case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), a father of a
student sought to enjoin the school district from prohibiting his children's attendance at school
after they refused tosalute the flag. Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for an 8-1 majority, found
that the flag salute requirement was constitutional so long as students have the "right to believe
as they please, to win others to their way of belief, and their right to assemble in their chosen
places of worship for the devotional ceremonies of their faith, are fully respected." Id. at 600.
In his dissent, Justice Stone argued,
Here we have such a small minority entertaining in good faith a religious belief, which
is such a departure from the usual course of human conduct, that most persons are
disposed to regard it with little toleration or concern. In such circumstances careful
scrutiny of legislative efforts to secure conformity of belief and opinion by a compul-
sory affirmation of the desired belief is especially needful if civil rights are to receive
any protection. Tested by this standard, I am not preposed to say that the right of this
small and helpless minority, including children having a strong religious conviction,
whether they understand its nature or not, to refrain from an expression obnoxious to
their religion is to be overborne by the interest of the state in maintaining discipline in
the schools.
hd. at 310 U.S. 606 (Stone, J., dissenting).
Three years after its initial decision, the Supreme Court reversed its position in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), holding that a school board could not
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when he wrote the following: "[D]issents or concurring opinions may
salvage for tomorrow the principle that was sacrificed or forgotten
today. 47
Courting Justice suggests that Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion
in Bowers v. Hardwick,48 and Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale49 may provide a basis for future Jus-
tices to recognize the just claims of gays and lesbians to constitutional
protection from discrimination and to recognition of gays and lesbians
as full citizens under the Constitution. In his dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick, Justice Blackmun chastised the Court for its prejudice
against homosexuals by failing to recognize the fundamental right of
homosexuals to sexual privacy, which he found violated by Georgia's
criminal sodomy statute.5° Blackmun wrote, "[I]t is revolting to have
no better reason for a rule of law than that ... it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past. '51
Justice Stevens' dissent in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale similarly
provides prospective guidance for justices who would abandon an ap-
parent gay exception for constitutional protection.52 Justice Stevens
wrote,
The only apparent explanation for the majority's holding ... is that
homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that
their presence alone-unlike any other individual's-should be sin-
gled out for special First Amendment treatment. Under the major-
ity's reasoning, an openly gay male is irreversibly affixed with the
label 'homosexual.' That label even though unseen, communicates
a message that permits his exclusion wherever he goes. His open-
ness is the sole and sufficient justification for his ostracism. Though
require public school teachers and students to salute the flag. The Court applied the type of
scrutiny urged by Justice Stone and concluded that First Amendment freedom can be restricted
"only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect."
Id. at 639.
In a companion case, Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943), the Court overturned criminal
conviction of two defendants found guilty of violating a state statute prohibiting the dissemina-
tion of information advocating refusal to salute, honor, or respect the flag. The Court found that
the criminal statute infringed both First Amendment freedom of speech and press. Id. at 589-90.
47. William 0. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. OF THE AM. JUDICA-
TURE Soc'y 104, 107 (1948).
48. 478 U.S. at 199-214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. 530 U.S. at 663-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. 530 U.S. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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unintended, reliance on such a justification is tantamount to a con-
stitutionally prescribed symbol of inferiority.53
Justice Stevens urged that the Constitution should not be a barrier to
a state's antidiscrimination law that would prohibit exclusion of homo-
sexuals from groups such as the Boy Scouts of America.
The authors of Courting Justice correctly fault the Supreme Court
for lagging behind American society in acceptance of homosexuals to
full social participation. However, because the focus of their work is
on the activity of the United States Supreme Court, the authors effec-
tively undervalue the significance of legal developments in Congress
and, more particularly, at the state and local level. While the Court
upheld the exclusion of homosexuals upon a finding that they were
"psychopaths" in Boutilier,54 Congress enacted an immigration law
that no longer bars the immigration of homosexuals. 55 At the time of
the Court's decision in ONE Inc. in 1958, every state's criminal stat-
utes included a provision authorizing prosecution for commission of
sodomy. Today, as a result of judicial decision or legislative enact-
ment, only sixteen states have criminal sodomy statutes.56 In 1958, no
person in the United States had any job protection from discrimina-
tion based on the person's sexual orientation. Today, eleven states
have statutes providing employment protection from discrimination
based on sexual orientation, and more than one hundred municipali-
ties prohibit job discrimination against homosexuals.57
Courting Justice provides a valuable history of the approximate half
century in which the United States Supreme Court has explicitly dealt
with cases involving issues of gay and lesbian rights. The contextual
material and biographical details of Justices and litigants provides the
basis for a fuller appreciation of the history of the constitutional law
aspects of gay and lesbian American history.58 It seems likely that in
the not so distant future, the Court will be confronted by gays and
lesbians claiming the right to marriage, the right to protection from
discrimination in employment, and the right to full participation in
civil society, including the right to military service.
53. Id. at 696.
54. 387 U.S. at 118.
55. See supra note 12.
56. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE & NAN HUNTER, SEXUALITY. GENDER AND THE LAW: 2001 Sup-
PL EMENT 7 (2001).
57. See WILLIAM RUI3ENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW: 1999 SUPPLEMENT TO
CASES AND MATERIALS 40 (2d ed. 1999).
58. The historical background for the Supreme Court's activity involving gay and lesbian
claims to constitutional and legal protection is provided in John D'Emilio's Sexual Politics, Sex-
ual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 (2d ed.
1998) and John Gallagher & Chris Bull's, Perfect Enemies: The Battle Between the Religious
Right and the Gay Movement (1996).
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